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Abstract 
Responding to the need to address heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA) to target 
leverage in a manner that reflects the fractional nature of leverage, we estimate SOAs across 
sub-samples of UK firms using the Dynamic Panel Fractional estimator (DPF). Using firm 
risk as a categorising variable, we show that riskier firms tend to adjust to target leverage at a 
faster rate, suggesting opportunity costs of being away from target leverage are higher for 
riskier firms. We also demonstrate the bias in SOAs as estimated using a model that does not 
account for the fractional nature of leverage, and show that this bias can result in spurious 
inferences being made when comparing SOAs across sub-samples. Our results cast doubt on 
existing evidence relating to heterogeneity in SOAs of UK firms.  
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I. Introduction 
Since Modigliani and Miller postulated their capital structure irrelevancy theorem in 1958, 
extensive research has been conducted on the relevance of capital structure to firm value. 
Principal among the competing theories that have emerged are the trade-off theory, pecking 
order theory and market timing theory, and research in the area of capital structure has 
focused on assessing the validity of these theories. One testing method commonly adopted is 
to employ a dynamic partial adjustment model to test for the existence of a target leverage 
ratio which firms actively adjust towards, and to estimate the speed at which adjustment takes 
place. Evidence indicating speedy adjustment to target leverage would provide support for 
the trade-off theory over its leading competitor, as its core hypothesis states that each firm 
has a unique optimal capital structure at which its cost of capital is minimised and firm value 
is maximised. Results of studies adopting this approach almost unanimously conclude that 
firms make financing decisions with adjustment towards a target capital structure in mind, 
suggesting the trade-off theory plays a significant role in explaining capital structure 
decisions.  
 However, there are two reasons why the manner in which this approach is commonly 
adopted may be problematic. First, there is a growing consensus that the factors motivating 
firms’ financing decisions are not homogenous across firms (Beattie et al., 2006; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011), and so any speed of adjustment estimated using a 
large aggregated sample of firm-year observations fails to take this heterogeneity into 
account. Thus, although a comparison of results across these studies suggests firms actively 
adjust to target leverage ratios, the speeds of adjustment estimated only indicate the 
importance to the “average” firm of achieving target leverage. Second, the dynamic partial 
adjustment model involves regressing current actual leverage ratios on lagged actual leverage 
ratios, with the coefficient on lagged actual leverage implying the speed of adjustment (SOA) 
to target leverage. However, the methods commonly employed to estimate this model ignore 
or do not fully account for the censored nature of the leverage ratio. Leverage ratios can only 
take values from 0 to 1, and thus methodologies that don’t take the fractional nature of 
leverage ratios into account will produce biased estimates of the speed of adjustment (Elsas 
and Florysiak, 2011).  
 Following on from the work of Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and Drobetz et al (2015), 
this study responds to these issues by estimating the Dynamic Panel Fractional (DPF) 
estimator on sub-samples of UK firm-year observations across which theory and empirical 
evidence suggest speeds of adjustment are likely to vary. Our results show that the DPF 
estimator implies a faster average SOA (27.9%) as compared to that implied by the Blundell-
Bond (2008) estimator (20.9%), a finding consistent with that of Drobetz et al (2015). This 
indicates that prior reported UK average adjustment speeds estimated using the Blundell-
Bond (BB) estimator may not represent the true leverage targeting behaviour of the “average” 
UK firm. Furthermore, when we split our sample into sub-samples based on risk, the results 
produced by the DPF estimator indicate that riskier firms exhibit faster SOAs, suggesting 
opportunity costs of being away from target leverage are higher for riskier firms. These 
findings are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015). However, these 
differences in the SOAs across the risk sub-samples are smaller in magnitude than those 
implied by the BB estimator, and thus question the heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms as 
reported by prior studies employing the BB estimator.  
This study makes two key contributions to the capital structure literature. First, to the 
best of our knowledge we are the first study to examine heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK 
firms using the DPF estimator. Although Drobetz et al (2015) estimate the SOA of the 
average UK firm using the DPF estimator, any results presented in relation to sub-samples 
are based on sub-samples of firms across the G7 countries, and thus heterogeneity of SOAs 
specifically within the UK is not addressed. Second, by comparing the heterogeneity in SOAs 
across the DPF and BB estimators using three different sub-sampling methods, we extend the 
work of Elsas and Florysiak (2015) who compare heterogeneity in SOAs across DPF and BB 
estimators using sub-samples of US firms based on credit ratings alone.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the extant 
literature relating to dynamic partial adjustment models. Section III outlines the salient 
features of our data and methodology. Section IV discusses the results of the DPF and BB 
estimators and section V concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Over the last half century, the capital structure literature has focused on forming theories that 
can explain observed variation in firms’ capital structures, and subsequently assessing the 
validity of these theories via econometric tests of their empirical predictions. Many different 
methodological approaches have been adopted to test these predictions, resulting in evidence 
being found in favour of and against each theory. One approach that has come to dominate 
recent empirical studies is the dynamic partial adjustment model. This model assesses 
whether or not firms financing decisions are motivated by a desire to achieve a target 
leverage ratio, and estimates the speed at which adjustment to this target occurs. Evidence 
indicating such behaviour would provide support for the explanatory power of the trade-off 
theory, as it hypothesises that each firm has an optimal capital structure, that if achieved, will 
minimise cost of capital and maximise firm value. Moreover, such evidence would also raise 
doubt as to the validity of the pecking order theory and market timing theory, as both theories 
imply a firm’s capital structure is the accumulation of a series of historical financing 
decisions that have not been aimed at achieving a target leverage ratio. Thus, the dynamic 
partial adjustment model is often employed as a test of the trade-off theory versus competing 
theories, with results invariably indicating firms actively adjust to a target leverage ratio. 
However, two issues with the manner in which this approach is commonly employed have 
been identified, suggesting a more nuanced approach is required if it is to be fit for purpose.  
 
Conditionality of Factors 
There is a growing consensus that the factors affecting firms’ capital structures are not 
homogenous across firms, but are conditional on firm characteristics (Frank and Goyal, 
2009), economic circumstances (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006) and market setting 
(Antoniou et al, 2008). This conditionality implies that dynamic partial adjustment models 
estimated using large aggregated samples of firm-year observations may result in spurious 
inferences being made as to the relative explanatory powers of capital structure theories. The 
“average” firm may be seen to adjust to target leverage ratios, but the speed of adjustment 
(SOA) to target leverage might vary significantly across sub-samples of firms. Thus, it may 
be the case that for some firms, closing the gap between actual and target leverage may be of 
second order importance to considerations consistent with the pecking order theory or market 
timing theory, but this would be unidentified or understated if large aggregated samples are 
employed.  
 In an attempt to account for this potential heterogeneity in leverage targeting 
behaviour, a number of studies estimate SOAs for sub-samples of firms across which the 
benefits and costs of achieving target leverage, or the ability to do so, are likely to differ. 
Oztekin (2015) conducts a cross country comparison of SOAs, where countries are 
characterised by the quality of their legal and financial institutions. The study finds that in 
countries with high quality institutions firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds, as the costs of 
adjustment are lower and firms have better access to capital markets. Using US data, Liao et 
al (2015) assess the role of corporate governance on firms’ SOAs. The results show that firms 
with better corporate governance practices have higher target leverage ratios and adjust faster 
to these targets, whilst firms with entrenched management tend to have lower target leverage 
ratios and exhibit slower adjustment speeds. Estimating the cost of deviation from target 
leverage via its effect on the cost of equity, Zhou et al (2016) investigate SOAs across sub-
samples that differ in terms of the sensitivity of the cost of equity to deviation from target 
leverage. Their findings indicate that firms whose cost of equity is highly sensitive to 
deviations from target tend to have higher SOAs, with the effect being more pronounce when 
firms are above their target leverage rather than below.  
 
Fractional Nature of Leverage 
The dynamic partial adjustment model involves regressing firms’ current leverage ratios on 
lagged leverage ratios and an estimate of the target leverage ratio. A statistically significant 
coefficient for the lagged leverage ratio indicates firms’ actively adjust to target leverage, 
whilst the magnitude of the coefficient implies the SOA. A number of econometric methods 
have been employed to estimate such a model, where issues relating to unobserved firm 
fixed-effects, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, and 
the unbalanced nature of panels can be adequately addressed (Drobetz et al, 2015). However, 
one issue that continuously fails to be addressed is the fractional nature of leverage. 
 By definition, a firm’s leverage ratio is bounded between 0 and 1. However, standard 
estimators used to measure SOA fail to take this into account, resulting in SOA estimates that 
may be severely biased due to mechanical mean reversion (Chang and Disgupta, 2009). 
Furthermore, easy work-arounds often used to reduce this bias, such as dropping all 
observations with zero leverage, or observations with values of leverage below 0.1 and above 
0.9, fail to adequately account for the impact of the bounded leverage ratio (Elsas and 
Florysiak, 2015). To address this issue of mechanical mean reversion, Elsas and Florysiak 
(2011) develop a doubly censored Tobit estimator, referred to as the Dynamic Panel 
Fractional (DPF) estimator, which can be applied to unbalanced panel data where the lagged 
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable and unobserved firm fixed effects 
are present. They demonstrate that not only is the estimator robust to mechanical mean 
reversion, it can identify zero SOAs when changes in leverage are random, and is the only 
estimator that should be employed when comparing SOAs across sub-samples.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
Building on the work of Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and Drobetz et al (2015), this study 
investigates heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms by applying the DPF estimator to sub-
samples of firms across which the opportunity cost of deviation from target leverage is 
expected to differ.  
 
Data 
Our sample is sourced from DataStream, and is comprised of UK listed firms for which 
relevant data is available between 1/7/1995 and 30/06/2016. Following almost all studies on 
capital structure, financial institutions are excluded, and to minimise the effect of outliers, all 
variables are winsorised at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions. Observations with 
negative values of book value of equity are dropped, whilst firms must have a minimum of 
three consecutive observations to be included in the sample. The final dataset is an 
unbalanced panel of 18,337 firm-year observations, 3,531 of which have zero debt.  
 
Variables 
We employ 7 independent variables which collectively proxy for a firm’s target leverage 
ratio. These variables are firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, market-to-book, capital 
expenditure, research and development, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
research and development costs are reported in the income statement.  We measure our 
leverage ratios in book values only, prompted by Beattie et al. (2006) who find that 83% of 
UK Finance directors who measure financial gearing do so using book values. Table 1 
provides definitions of the dependent and independent variables employed, table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for all variables and table 3 presents univariate correlation coefficients 
between each pair of variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition and Notes 
Leverage 
tdta 
The ratio of total debt to total assets.  
Firm Size 
lnta 
The natural log of total assets. 
Asset Tangibility 
tang 
The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
Profitability 
roa 
The ratio of EBIT to total assets 
Market-to-Book  
mtb 
The ratio of market value ordinary shares + total debt + book 
value preference shares to total assets 
Capital Expenditure 
capexta 
The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets  
Research and Development 
resdev 
The ratio of research and development expenditure to total 
assets 
R&D Dummy 
resdevdum 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when a firm reports 
research and development expenditure and 0 otherwise  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
tdta 0 0.6300 0.1118 0.1511 0.1550 
lnta 6.4409 16.1885 10.6067 10.7696 2.0166 
tang 0 0.9296 0.1595 0.2485 0.2510 
roa -1.5770 0.3524 0.0556 -0.0258 0.2901 
mtb 0.2269 12.6277 1.0704 1.6749 1.8954 
capexta 0 0.3224 0.0285 0.0477 0.0580 
resdev 0 0.4677 0 0.0272 0.0760 
resdevdum 0 1 0 0.3153 0.4647 
Statistics are calculated having winsorised all variables at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions 
 
Table 3: Univariate Correlation Coefficients 
 tdta lnta tang roa mtb capexta resdev resdevdum 
tdta  1.00        
lnta 0.34***  1.00       
tang 0.38*** 0.28***  1.00      
roa 0.10*** 0.39*** 0.17***  1.00     
mtb -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.16*** -0.26***  1.00    
capexta 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.533*** 0.06*** 0.05***  1.00   
resdev -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.38*** 0.33*** -0.07***  1.00  
resdevdum -0.10*** -0.005 -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.16*** -0.07*** 0.53***  1.00 
Coefficients estimated are Pearson correlation coefficients. *, ** and *** denote coefficient significance levels of p≤.01, p≤.05 and 
p≤.1, respectively. Statistics are calculated having winsorised all variables at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions  
 
Formulation of Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model  
Assume that each firm has its own endogenously determined target leverage ratio, which is a 
function of a set of observable lagged firm characteristics, as well as unobservable firm-
specific time-invariant effects. This can be expressed as: 

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where itD* is the target leverage ratio of firm i at time t, 
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characteristics for firm i at time t-1, i  represents unobserved firm-specific time-invariant 
effects, and itu  is an error term. If firms are assumed to adjust their leverage ratios each 
period such that the actual leverage ratio is as close as possible to the target leverage ratio for 
that period, the change in the actual leverage ratio in a given time period can be expressed as: 
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where itD  is the actual leverage ratio in time t, 1 itit DD  is the change in actual leverage ratio 
from time t-1 to t, 1*  itit DD  is the required change in leverage ratio from time t-1 to t to 
achieve the target leverage ratio, and   represents the fraction of the required change in the 
leverage ratio actually achieved. 
In the traditional static model the firm is assumed to always be at its optimum 
leverage ratio, and thus the change in the leverage ratio in any period exactly equals the 
required change, and hence λ = 1. If, however, firms are indifferent to their capital structures, 
no target exists and any change in the leverage ratio is randomly associated with the 
perceived required change, hence λ = 0. Finally, if firms do attempt to achieve an optimum 
capital structure but are hindered by adjustment costs, the actual change will be a fraction of 
the required change, and λ will lie between 0 and 1. λ therefore represents the speed at which 
the firm adjusts to its target. Combining equations 1 and 2 above results in: 
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Bringing all 1itD  over to the RHS, multiplying out the terms in brackets, and factoring out 
1itD  results in:  
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Thus, the model to be tested states that the leverage ratio of firm i in time t is a function of the 
leverage ratio in time t-1, and a set of firm characteristics hypothesised to represent a firm’s 
target leverage ratio in time t. In order to account for the fractional nature of the dependent 
variable, we estimate equation 4 using the DPF estimator developed by Elsas and Floysiak 
(2011). We also estimate the model using the System Generalised Methods of Moments 
estimator as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), as this is the most commonly employed 
estimator when implementing a dynamic partial adjustment model, particularly when SOAs 
are compared across sub-samples. Estimating both models allows us to demonstrate the scale 
of the bias in the estimate of the SOA when estimators that do not address the fractional 
nature of the dependent variable are employed to compare SOAs across sub-samples. For 
both models we include time dummies to capture the effect of unobserved time-specific firm-
invariant fixed effects.  
 
Sub-Sampling Method 
In order to investigate heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms, we follow the approach of 
Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015) and divide firms into sub-samples based on risk. Elsas and 
Florysiak (2011) suggest that whilst riskier firms may exhibit slower speeds of adjustment 
due to higher adjustment costs, they may also exhibit faster adjustment speeds due to higher 
opportunity costs of being away from target leverage. Thus, estimating SOAs across sub-
samples that differ in terms of risk provides an opportunity to not only investigate 
heterogeneity in SOAs, but also generate evidence in favour of one of two hypotheses that are 
in direct contradiction.  
 To distinguish between high and low risk firms, we use three variables as categorising 
mechanisms. First, as the cash flows of larger firms are likely to be less volatile due to greater 
diversification of lines of business, we classify large firms as low risk and small firms as high 
risk. Second, as the liquidation values of firms are likely to be directly related to the degree to 
which their assets are tangible in nature, we classify firms with high proportions of tangible 
assets as low risk and firms with low proportions of tangible assets as high risk. Finally, 
given that firm size and asset tangibility may proxy firm characteristics other than risk, we 
conduct exploratory factor analysis on all of our explanatory variables. We find that the 
factor loadings of the first factor generated, and the only factor with an eigenvalue greater 
than one, are positive in firm size, asset tangibility, profitability and capital expenditure, and 
negative in market-to-book, research and development, and research and development 
dummy. We assume this factor to represent risk i.e. firms that are larger, more profitable, 
have higher levels of new and existing tangible assets, have fewer growth opportunities and 
invest less in research and development pose lower risk to investors. We therefore estimate a 
factor score for each observation, and classify firms with a high factor score as low risk and 
firms with a low factor score as high risk.  
 
IV. Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the dynamic partial adjustment model using the full sample of 
firm-year observations. The Wald χ2 statistic for each model rejects the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero, whilst the AR(2) and Hansen χ2 
statistics relating to the BB model indicate, respectively, that second order serial correlation 
is not present and that the set of instruments employed can be considered exogenous.   
 The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables as generated by the DPF and BB 
estimators imply SOAs of 27.9% and 20.9%, respectively, suggesting the average UK firm 
does indeed adjust to a target leverage ratio.  However, qualitatively speaking, the bias 
associated with the BB estimator appears to be quite significant, as the DPF estimator is 
approximately 33% faster in relative terms. This is consistent with the findings of Drobetz et 
al (2015) who observe an SOA of 25% for the average firm in the G7 countries when 
employing the DPF estimator, and a corresponding SOA of 18.2% when employing the BB 
estimator. Furthermore, dropping firm-year observations with 0 leverage ratios appears to 
have little or no impact in terms of reducing the bias associated with the BB estimator, as the 
implied SOA using the sub-sample with positive leverage ratios is 20.2%. These results 
suggest that SOAs estimated for UK firms in prior studies using the BB estimator may be 
drawing spurious conclusions as to the true SOA of the average UK firm.  
In relation to the determinants of target leverage, the coefficients for l.lnta, l.mtb and 
l.capexta are consistent across the three models and with the existing literature, indicating 
that larger firms with fewer growth opportunities and higher spending on fixed assets have 
higher target leverage ratios as they pose less risk to lenders. The results relating to l.tang, 
l.roa, l.resdev and l.resdevdum appear model dependent, with coefficient signs and 
significance levels varying by estimator and sample. Why the coefficients for these variables 
should differ across the models is not immediately apparent. Of particular interest are the 
positive coefficients for l.roa and l.resdev as generated by the DPF estimator, as most studies 
find negative coefficients for these variables. Perhaps more profitable firms have greater 
access to debt markets due to increased ability to repay debt, whilst firms with significant 
investment in R&D favour debt financing due to potential adverse selection costs associated 
with equity issues.  
 
Table 4: Results of the Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model – Full Sample 
 DPF BB 
BB 
tdta>0 
l.tdta       0.721*** 
(0.009) 
      0.791*** 
(0.024) 
      0.798*** 
(0.026) 
l.lnta       0.010*** 
(0.002) 
      0.008*** 
(0.002) 
    0.006** 
(0.002) 
l.tang -0.003 
(0.010) 
    0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
l.roa      0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
l.mtb            -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) 
     -0.002*** 
   (0.0008) 
  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
l.capexta       0.132*** 
(0.020) 
      0.102*** 
(0.030) 
      0.153*** 
(0.035) 
l.resdev     0.049** 
(0.024) 
  0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.019 
(0.050) 
l.resdevdum            -0.004 
(0.004) 
            -0.007 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
    
N 15,752 15,752 12,187 
Wald χ2(35)       13961***   
Wald χ2(29)        3245***    36342*** 
AR(1)      -15.36***    -14.92*** 
AR(2)               -0.07 0.49 
Hansen χ2(303)  314 288 
Standard errors are in parentheses. . *, ** and *** denote coefficient significance levels of p≤.01, p≤.05 and p≤.1, 
respectively. 
To investigate the heterogeneity in SOAs across UK firms, table 5 presents SOAs 
generated using sub-samples of firm-year observations. For the sake of brevity, only the 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of the lagged dependent variable are 
presented, along with the implied SOAs, the difference in SOAs across sub-samples, and a z-
test statistic that indicates the extent to which SOAs can be considered significantly different 
across sub-samples.
4
 All lagged coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The sub-samples 
are generated using firm size, asset tangibility and a factor assumed to represent risk as 
categorising variables. Panel A presents results for sub-samples with observations below and 
above the sample median value of the relevant categorising variable. Panel B presents results 
for sub-samples with observations below and above the sample 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile values 
of the relevant categorising variable, respectively.  
  A comparison of the SOAs across the three pairs of sub-samples in panel A 
show that riskier firms adjust to target leverage ratios faster than less risky firms. These 
results are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015) and suggest that riskier 
firms face higher opportunity costs of deviating from target leverage, and thus have a greater 
incentive to adjust to target leverage. In addition, the larger disparities across the sub-sample 
SOAs as generated by the BB estimator demonstrate support for Elsas and Florysiak’s (2015) 
assertion, that when assessing heterogeneity of SOAs, a biased estimator may lead to 
spurious inferences being made. Indeed, panel B demonstrates that this bias can lead to 
increasingly unreliable results being generated as ever more extreme sub-samples are 
compared. The disparities between the sub-sample SOAs as generated by the BB model 
become larger and statistically more significant in panel B, whilst those relating to the DPF 
model become smaller and statistically less significant across the asset tangibility sub-
samples and risk factor sub-samples. As such, the SOAs generated by the DPF model in 
panels A and B suggest the relationship between SOA and firm size may be monotonic, 
whilst those between SOA and asset tangibility, and SOA and risk factor, may be non-
monotonic. On the other hand, the SOAs generated by the BB model suggest all three 
relationships are monotonic. These results are again comparable to those presented by Elsas 
                                                 
1
 The z test statistic is calculated as follows: 
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 , where 1 and 2 are the coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable within each sub-sample pairing, and se 1 and se 2 are the associated standard 
errors. 
and Florysiak (2015), where the patterns of SOAs generated by the DPF and BB models 
across sub-samples based on credit ratings differ significantly.  
 
Table 5: SOAs across Risk Sub-Samples 
  DPF BB 
Categorising 
Variable 
Sub-Sample l.tdta SOA 
Diff 
z-test 
l.tdta SOA 
Diff    
z-test 
Panel A 
Firm Size 
Small 
0.712 
(0.016) 
0.288 
0.051 
2.40** 
0.765 
(0.035) 
0.235 
0.084 
1.85* 
Large 
0.763 
(0.014) 
0.237 
0.849 
(0.029) 
0.151 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Low 
Tangibility 
0.704 
(0.015) 
0.296 
0.041 
2.07** 
0.726 
(0.034) 
0.274 
0.083 
1.83* High 
Tangibility 
0.745 
(0.013) 
0.255 
0.809 
(0.030) 
0.191 
Risk Factor 
High Risk 
0.714 
(0.016) 
0.286 
0.050 
2.43** 
0.735 
(0.029) 
0.265 
0.090 
2.27** 
Low Risk 
0.764 
(0.013) 
0.236 
0.825 
(0.027) 
0.175 
Panel B 
Firm Size 
Very Small 
0.678 
(0.026) 
0.322 
0.092 
2.96*** 
0.664 
(0.046) 
0.336 
0.126 
2.27** 
Very Large 
0.770 
(0.017) 
0.230 
0.790 
(0.031) 
0.210 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Very Low 
Tangibility 
0.732 
(0.025) 
0.268 
0.015 
0.48 
0.599 
(0.051) 
0.401 
0.255 
4.24*** Very High 
Tangibility 
0.747 
(0.019) 
0.253 
0.854 
(0.032) 
0.146 
Risk Factor 
Very High 
Risk 
0.712 
(0.028) 
0.288 
0.046 
1.36 
0.654 
(0.054) 
0.346 
0.193 
3.15*** Very Low 
Risk 
0.758 
(0.019) 
0.242 
0.847 
(0.029) 
0.153 
 
V. Conclusion 
This study investigates heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA) to target leverage in 
UK firms. Using the Dynamic Panel Fractional estimator which accounts for the censored 
nature of leverage, we find that a firm’s SOA to target leverage is dependent on the level of 
risk it poses to investors. High risk firms are observed to adjust to target leverage at a faster 
rate than low risk firms, suggesting that the opportunity cost of deviation from target leverage 
is higher for riskier firms. We also demonstrate that SOAs estimated using the Blundell-Bond 
(BB) estimator, which does not account for the censored nature of leverage, produces 
markedly different SOAs, both when the full sample of observations is employed, and when 
SOAs are estimated across sub-samples of observations. These findings suggest that SOAs 
reported by studies using the BB estimator are likely biased, particularly in relation to SOAs 
generated using sub-samples. Our results are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak 
(2011, 2015) and Drobetz et al (2015), and demonstrate the need to address both 
heterogeneity in SOAs and the fractional nature of leverage when estimating SOAs in a 
dynamic partial adjustment setting. 
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